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Abstract:  
Criminal law comprises retributive sanctions as well as preventive measures in order to 
preserve public order and security. Even the rehabilitation of offenders is intended to provide public 
tranquillity. However, to achieve this goal requires the penalization of attempted crimes as a pre-
emptive action so that official authorities can intervene to combat potential dangerous activities. 
Nevertheless, voluntary renunciation from such activities may eliminate the possible danger of the 
prohibited act. Additionally, it is often indicative of remorsefulness of the perpetrator. It can justify 
the exemption of the offender from criminal liability. Thus, it is ethically unreasonable to punish a 
person who voluntarily desists from a criminal attempt. However, there is sharp disagreement over 
the legal nature of voluntary renunciation. It has been shown in the present paper that there is a 
wide-ranging discussion on the basis and status of voluntary renunciation in criminal law. The main 
aim of this article is to provide a comparative overview of the matter, but it has to be preceded by 
explaining the concept of voluntary renunciation as well as the distinction between renunciation 
and withdrawal. 
Keywords: Criminal Attempt, Voluntary Renunciation, Public Order, Rehabilitation, 
Abandonment, Withdrawal 
صخلملا: 
ينملأاو ماعلا ماظنلا ىلع ظافحلل ةيئاقو يربادت لىإ ةفاضلإاب ةيئازج تابوقع يئانلجا نوناقلا نمضت، 
و ةانلجا ليهأت ةداعإ تىح تيلا يرفوت لىإ فدتهةنيكسلا ماعلا،ة  ةبقاعم فدلها اذه قيقتح بلطتي كلذ عمو لك
وامحباكترلا ةل مئارلجا اذهو  ةطشنلأا ةحفاكلم لخدتلا نم ةيسمرلا تاطلسلا نكمتت تىح يئاقو ءارجإك
طلخايرةلمتمحتا ة،  لمتمحتا رطلخا ىلع يضقي دق ةطشنلأا هذه نع يعوطلا يلختلا نإف كلذ عمو روظمحتا لعفلل
كلذ لىإ ةفاضلإاب نوكي ام ابلاغ ، يلختلانيالجا مدن ىلع ارشؤم، نكيمه فعإ ربري نأ ةيلوؤسلما نم نيالجا ءا
ةيئانلجا،  صخشلا ةبقاعم ايقلاخأ لوقعلما يرغ نمفةيمارجإ ةلوامح نم اعوط فكي يذلا، كلذ عمو  فلاخ كانه
يعوطلا يلختلل ةينوناقلا ةعيبطلا لوح داح .ينبتو  ساسأ ىلع قاطنلا ةعساو ةشقانم كانه نأ ةقرولا هذه
يئانلجا نوناقلا في يعوطلا يلختلا ةلاحو، ويمدقت وه ةلاقلما هذه نم يسيئرلا فدلها هذله ةنراقم ةماع ةرظن 
ةلأسلمابحسلاو لزانتلا ينب زييمتلا كلذكو يعوطلا يلختلا موهفم حرش كلذ قبسي نأ بيج نكلو ،. 
ةيحاتفملا تاملكلا: محتا ةلوالجاباحسنلاا ،ليهأتلا ةداعإ ،ماعلا ماظنلا ،يعوطلا يلختلا ،ةيئان. 
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1- Introduction: 
Criminal law imposes punishment for those who engage in prohibited 
conducts by law. In general, the conduct is mainly done to achieve desirable goal, 
result or outcome. Not always the result is possible for several factors not related 
to the actor’s desire and actions. This is why the doctrine of attempted criminal 
liability has been created, as a powerful tool to protect society from dangerous act 
and dangerous actors.
1
 This justification is based on the preservation of public 
order. Wrongdoing and harm are the two key factors that should be taken into 
account in this regard. However, the value and status of these factors is largely 
dependent on the justification of criminal law.  
If we should not be abolitionists, criminal law must be capable of realizing 
some value that gives us sufficient reason to retain it. To offer an account of this 
value is to offer a general justification of criminal law. Obviously enough, the 
functions of criminal law tell us something about what this might be. If the 
punitive view is correct, criminal law’s value consists in delivering justified 
punishment. If the curial view is correct, that value consists (in part) in people 
offering answers that they have reason to offer. If the preventive view is correct, it 
consists in preventing criminal wrongs. There are wrong less harms (think of 
sporting injures caused without foul play) and harmless wrongs (think of botched 
conspiracies or undiscovered attempts). One possibility is that criminal law’s 
concern with wrongs is derivative of its concern with harms: criminal law should 
prevent wrongs (e.g., conspiracy to injure) when and because harm is thereby 
prevented (e.g., injury itself). Another possibility is that criminal law’s concern 
with harms is derivative of its concern with wrongs: criminal law should prevent 
harms (e.g., physical injury) when and because those harms are wrongfully 
caused (e.g., by assault) A third possibility is that harms and wrongs provide two 
independent sources of general justification. Whatever the answer, this preventive 
value is impersonal in two ways: it is not grounded in any special relationship; 
and it is value that might in principle be realised by any of us.
2
 
As regards criminal attempts, the preventive view plays a significant role. 
It is because that an attempted crime does not itself cause the prohibited result 
which is contemplated by the offender. However, it is justifiable to punish a 
person who attempts to commit a crime merely on the basis that exercising such 
punishment may prevent others from doing so.  
Admittedly, the fact of change of mind seems intuitively to be of 
tremendous ethical importance to responsibility for attempt
3
. If we consider 
wrongs and harms as independent factors of the justification of criminal law, 
voluntary abandonment of criminal attempts can justifiably be recognized as a 
ground for the exemption of criminal liability or punishment. In fact, the 
preventive view is a two-sided theoretical basis in respect of criminal attempts. It 
justifies the penalization of attempts on the one hand and non-punishment of 
voluntary renunciation on the other. Putting in other words, just as the 
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punishment of the perpetrators of attempts is intended to prevent possible 
criminal consequences as well as to empower the police and judicial authorities to 
intervene and combat dangerous activities, non-punishment of those who 
voluntarily abandon criminal attempts can be justified on the basis of preventive 
perspective.     
Voluntary renunciation is considered as an established institution in 
Romano-Germanic (civil law) system. However, although courts operating under 
the common law mentioned the concept, there was traditionally no renunciation 
defence
4. Under the MPC’s definition, a defendant is entitled to the affirmative 
defence of renunciation if “he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete 
and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.” A “complete and voluntary” 
renunciation must satisfy two factors: (1) it must “originate with the actor,” and 
not be brought about by circumstances that make the crime more difficult or 
dangerous to commit; and (2) it must be “permanent and complete, rather than 
temporary or contingent”.5 
What is essential is that the perpetrator voluntarily desists from the 
criminal act, but his or her motive is immaterial in this regard. Additionally, a 
third party’s intervention to prevent the criminal activity does not necessarily 
negate the voluntariness of renunciation. For example, if a third party by advising 
the perpetrator and without resorting to threat or force, causes him/her to desist 
from committing the crime, renunciation is regarded as voluntary. Accordingly, 
renunciation is deemed voluntary where the agent discontinues the criminal act, 
while hearing police sirens.
6
 Another example of voluntariness of renunciation is 
that the agent not because of being admonished, but due to his/her false belief that 
somebody else is present in the crime scene, abandoned his/her effort to commit 
the crime (Ibid, 228). A defendant, however, could not claim the defence if his 
abandonment was merely a postponement or was occasioned by the appearance 
of circumstances that made success less likely.
7
 
The difference between renunciation and repentance should be taken into 
account. Renunciation arises before the completion of a crime, whereas 
repentance occurs after that. For instance, if a thief after gathering stolen goods 
and leaving the house, repented of what he/she had done and returns the goods, 
he/she will be convicted of theft. In fact, it is not regarded as renunciation.
8
  It 
should be noted that in some criminal justice systems renunciation can be a 
defence even if it occurs after committing the prohibited act, provided that the 
perpetrator prevents the result that would constitute the completed crime. 
9
 
From a consequentialist perspective, the key difference between a 
completed attempt and an abandoned attempt is in the risk created by each. A 
completed attempt creates a risk of social harm beyond that which is created by 
an abandoned attempt: someone who abandons his attempt forgoes opportunity to 
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complete the harmful conduct that criminal laws prohibit. Therefore, mitigating 
the punishment for abandoned attempts could reduce social harm if, by punishing 
abandoned attempts less severely, punishment schemes can induce offenders to 
withdraw from their criminal conduct. This type of punishment scheme, which 
deters the completion of the crime but not its initiation, is said to achieve 
marginal deterrence.
10
  
Admittedly, a defendant cannot be charged with attempt if he has 
abandoned his pursuit of the substantive offense at the mere preparation stage. 
Yet, this is for want of an element of the offense of attempt—a substantial step—
rather than because of the availability of an affirmative abandonment defence. 
Putting in other words, there are cases in which the defendant abandons before 
he’s even tried to commit the crime; imagine the person who intends to rob a 
bank, has a hearty breakfast in preparation, and then changes his mind. But the 
explanation for why criminal penalties are inappropriate in cases like that does 
not appeal to the fact of change of mind. Instead, it points to the fact that the 
defendant has not done enough, or has not done the right kind of thing, to count 
as having attempted the crime at all.
11
 
Most criminal justice systems have recognized renunciation as a defence to 
criminal attempts, albeit by divergent provisions on the topic. However, there are 
almost common grounds justifying the recognition of renunciation as a defence. 
German criminal law seems to be a leading criminal justice system in developing 
the foundations of the defence. Over the years, the rationale of the German 
Criminal Code’s recognition of withdrawal from an attempt has been much 
debated in German criminal law, including in a spectrum of theories, including: 
 ‘‘rationale of punishment’’ theory: withdrawal renders punishment 
unnecessary for specific or general deterrence purposes; 
 ‘‘Golden bridge theory’’: punishment exemption gives offender an 
incentive to abandon the attempt by ‘‘building him a golden bridge’’, thus 
allowing him to ‘‘return to legality’’; 
 ‘‘element-negating and justification’’ theories: withdrawal negates 
liability by negating the requisite intent or functioning as a justification; largely 
abandoned, because it would extend to accomplices and because ‘‘an attempt 
remains an attempt’’ and cannot be undone.12   
2. Distinguishing between Renunciation and Withdrawal: 
It is very important to make a distinction between renunciation and 
withdrawal. The latter means a perpetrator’s voluntary exit from a criminal 
participation including conspiracy and complicity, whereas the former refers to a 
person’s desisting from a criminal attempt. In some criminal jurisdictions there 
are separate provisions and rules regarding the two categories. For instance, In 
the United States the three interrelated defences are abandonment, withdrawal 
and renunciation. Withdrawal is a defence for conspiracy liability, whereas 
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‘abandonment’ and ‘renunciation’ are applied to inchoate crimes. The defence is 
called abandonment defence in some states, but the terms renunciation defence 
and abandonment defence are frequently used interchangeably.
13
  
American jurisdictions that retain the English common law version of the 
crime now define conspiracy, consistent with Lord Denman’s famous opinion in 
Rex v. Jones (1832), as an agreement between two or more persons to commit an 
unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means. The actus reus of 
conspiracy is the agreement, which may be proven circumstantially through 
concerted action toward a common purpose. The mens rea of conspiracy is a dual 
intent: the defendant must have both intent to agree and intent to commit the 
object of the agreement.
14
 
Put simply, conspiracy is an inchoate crime, meaning that it contemplates 
the commission of a substantive crime. Its usual elements are: (1) an agreement to 
commit a crime; (2) an overt act taken in furtherance of the agreement; (3) and 
the intent to both agree to and to commit the conspiracy's substantive target 
crime.
15
 
Two interrelated justifications are traditionally advanced for punishing 
agreements to commit unlawful activity. First, conspiracy is an inchoate crime 
that allows law enforcement to intervene early enough in the criminal process to 
apprehend dangerous individuals and prevent their completion of planned acts. 
Second, conspiracies present special dangers to the public because the 
psychological dynamics and synergies of group activity make the object of a plan 
more likely to succeed when contemplated by a group than when contemplated 
by an individual.
16
 
It should be noted that although agreement is an essential element of 
conspiracy, it also requires an act illustrating the conspirators’ intent. Putting in 
other words, an overt act taken in furtherance of the agreement should be 
regarded as a key factor in the commission of conspiracy; otherwise prosecutors 
could arbitrarily accuse anyone of conspiracy merely for an agreement to commit 
a crime. A mere agreement is an expression of common desires of two or more 
persons to achieve a goal which should not be considered as a criminal act. 
However, if an agreement to commit a crime is at the same time accompanied by 
a certain plan to perform the intended crime, it can be classified as a criminal 
conspiracy. In fact, drawing the plan is regarded as an overt act. Thus, the 
expression ‘in furtherance of the agreement’ does not necessarily amount to an 
interval between the agreement and the act.  
As we have seen, traditional common law conspiracy doctrine did not 
admit a defence even if the actor subsequently renounced the conspiracy and 
actively worked to prevent its accomplishment. This rule flowed naturally from 
the doctrinal principle that a conspiracy is complete with the agreement; as soon 
as the agreement is made, the crime is completed, and no subsequent action can 
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exonerate the conspirator. The ALI (American Law Institute) considered this 
“strict and inflexible” rule to be overly severe, punishing even a momentary 
agreement from which the actor subsequently and completely withdrew. The ALI 
was not comforted by the overt act requirement, adopted at American common 
law to mitigate this harsh result and also embraced in the Code with respect to 
conspiracies to commit misdemeanours and lower-level felonies. The ALI 
thought that the overt act requirement provided insufficient protection against 
injustice “in view of the insignificant nature of the act that suffices.” 
Alternatively, the commentary to the Model Penal Code suggests that the defence 
of renunciation supplements the overt act requirement (and substitutes for the 
overt act in the case of second-degree felonies and above) with another locus 
penitential, giving the actor an opportunity to reconsider and avoid liability. In 
other words, one of the purposes of the overt act requirement is to provide a 
chance for a conspirator to withdraw from the conspiracy without accruing any 
liability. 
17
   
There are four primary implications of the withdrawal doctrine under 
federal conspiracy law. First, if the conspiracy requires proof of an overt act, such 
as under 18 U.S.C. § 371, withdrawal prior to the commission of an overt act 
means that the withdrawing actor is not liable for the conspiracy. Second, 
withdrawal commences the statute of limitations with respect to the withdrawing 
actor. Under federal law, withdrawal may thus be a complete defence to a 
conspiracy charge but only when coupled with a viable statute of limitations 
defence. Third, under the Pinkerton doctrine, the withdrawing conspirator is not 
liable for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators committed after the date of 
withdrawal, even if those crimes are in furtherance of the conspiracy and 
reasonably foreseeable. Finally, statements made by co-conspirators after the date 
of withdrawal are not admissible against the withdrawing conspirator under the 
hearsay exemption in subsection 801(d) (2) (E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Withdrawal is thus a far more limited doctrine than renunciation; unless it is 
undertaken before an overt act is completed by one member of the criminal 
enterprise or the statute of limitations has elapsed since the date of the actor’s 
withdrawal, proof of withdrawal does not insulate the actor from criminal liability 
altogether, but rather limits the proof that may be admissible against him.
18
  
However, not all criminal justice systems have made a distinction between 
the two concepts. For instance, in German Criminal Code (§ 24 & 31), the 
expression ‘withdrawal’ (Rücktritt) is being used for both renunciation from 
criminal attempts and withdrawal from attempted participation.
19
 Articles 24 & 
31 of the German Criminal Codes read as follows: 
§24.  (1) A person who of his own volition gives up the further execution of 
the offence or prevents its completion shall not be liable for the attempt. If the 
offence is not completed regardless of his actions, that person shall not be liable if 
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he has made a voluntary and earnest effort to prevent the completion of the 
offence.  
(2) If more than one person participate in the offence, the person who 
voluntarily prevents its completion shall not be liable for the attempt. His 
voluntary and earnest effort to prevent the completion of the offence shall suffice 
for exemption from liability, if the offence is not completed regardless of his 
actions or is committed independently of his earlier contribution to the offence. 
§ 31. (1) According to § 30 is not imposed on anyone who voluntarily 
gives up the first attempt to induce another to commit a crime, and about existing 
risk that the other commits the act, turning away, the second after he had agreed 
to a crime, gives up his plan or, adopted after he agreed a crime, or the offer of 
another to commit a crime had prevented action.  
(2) If it fails to act without the assistance of withdrawing or is it done 
irrespective of his previous behaviour, it is sufficient to his impunity be voluntary 
and serious effort to prevent the action.’’  
In some criminal justice systems, the terms ‘withdrawal’ and 
‘abandonment’ are interchangeably used in order to indicate an accomplice’s exit 
from a criminal complicity.
20
 For example, the Criminal Code of Finland (2015) 
in Chapter 5 (Section 2 (2)) reads as follows: 
‘‘If the offence involves several accomplices, the perpetrator, the instigator 
or the abettor is exempted from liability on the basis of withdrawal from an 
offence and elimination of the effects of an offence by the perpetrator only if he 
or she has succeeded in getting the other participants to withdraw from 
completion of the offence or otherwise been able to prevent the consequence 
referred to in the statutory definition of the offence or in another manner has 
eliminated the effects of his or her own actions on the completion of the offence.’’ 
Section 24 (Sub-sections 3 and 4) of Criminal Code of Czech Republic 
(2009) provides as follows: 
‘‘(3) Criminal liability of the participant shall expire, if he/she voluntarily 
abandons any further participation in commission of a crime and a) eliminates the 
threat to an interest protected by this Code arising from his/her participation in 
the offence; or  
b) Reports his/her attempt at a time when the threat to an interest protected 
by this Code arising from his/her participation in the offence could still be 
eliminated. The report must be made to a public prosecutor or police authority. A 
soldier may report it to his/her superior officer.  
 
ــــــــ  Voluntary Renunciation from Criminal Attempts, the Intersection of Public Order and Rehabilitation... 
 - 110 - 
(4) If there are several persons involved in an act, expiration criminal 
liability for the participation is not precluded in case of a participant who acted in 
such manner, if the act is completed by the other offenders despite his/her timely 
reporting or earlier participation in such an act.’’ 
Section 43 of Penal Code of Estonia reads as follows:   
‘‘If several offenders participate in an attempt, the person who prevents the 
occurrence of the consequences of the offence is deemed to have abandoned the 
attempt. If the consequences occur or do not occur regardless of the conduct of an 
offender, the offender is deemed to have abandoned the attempt if the offender 
earnestly endeavours to prevent the occurrence of the consequences.  
 (1) A person having committed an attempt to instigate a criminal offence, 
consented to a proposal to commit a criminal offence or agreed to commit a 
criminal offence is released from guilt if the person voluntarily:  
1) interrupts the instigation of another person to criminal offence and 
prevents the possible danger of committing the act;  
2) Abandons the consent granted for committing a criminal offence; or  
3) Prevents the agreed committing of a criminal offence.  
(2) If a criminal offence is committed or the committing thereof is 
refrained from regardless of the acts of the person, the person is deemed to have 
abandoned it if he or she earnestly endeavours to prevent the commission of the 
criminal offence.’’ 
As it can be seen, irrespective of some trivial differences in criminal 
jurisdictions, the following requirements should be met so that a court can award 
an exemption from punishment to those who have attempted to commit a 
corporate offence either as a participant or an accomplice:
21
  
 Causing the other participants to withdraw from completion of the 
offence; 
 Prevention of the attempted crime or the consequences of the act 
performed; 
 Making an earnest effort to prevent the commission of the crime;22 
 Elimination of the effects of his/her own actions on the completion of the 
offence or any threat to an interest protected by the criminal statute arising from 
his/her participation in the offence. 
3. Status of Renunciation in Criminal Justice Systems:  
3.1. The Consequentialist versus the Act-centred View:  
According to a pragmatic approach to criminal liability, result of a crime 
must be a key factor in the determination of judicial reaction to it. Upon this 
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attitude which can be characterized as ‘the consequentialist theory of criminal 
liability’, the legislature as the establisher of public order, should consider 
consequences of criminal acts as essential criteria of the formal reaction to any 
breach of criminal law. In other words, for those jurisdictions which have 
adopted this attitude, the result of criminal behaviour is more important than the 
perpetrator’s intent and his/her embarking on the abandonment of the intended 
crime. For instance, in Chinese criminal law, damage element is determinative of 
the punishment of voluntary discontinuation of a crime. Article 24 of Criminal 
Law of the People's Republic of China provides that ‘‘Discontinuation of a 
crime refers to a case where, in the course of committing a crime, the offender 
voluntarily discontinues the crime or voluntarily and effectively prevents the 
consequences of the crime from occurring. An offender who discontinues a crime 
shall, if no damage is caused, be exempted from punishment or, if any damage is 
caused, be given a mitigated punishment.’’  
There is a noteworthy provision in Finnish criminal law that shows an 
extreme consequentialist tendency. The Criminal Code of Finland has provided 
regulations of renunciation from an attempt and elimination of the effects of an 
offence by the perpetrator in Chapter 5, Section 2. According to Subsection 3 of 
Section 2, ‘‘In addition to what is provided in subsections 1 and 2, an attempt is 
not punishable if the offence is not completed or the consequence referred to in 
the statutory definition of the offence is not caused for a reason that is 
independent of the perpetrator, instigator or abettor, but he or she has voluntarily 
and seriously attempted to prevent the completion of the offence or the causing of 
the consequence.’’ As this provision specifies no causality link between 
perpetrator’s action and the incompletion of the offence or non-occurrence of the 
result is needed. In other words, if the offence is not completed or its 
consequence is not caused, the agent who voluntarily discontinues the crime will 
not be punishable, whether or not his/her effort to prevent the criminal result or 
withdrawal from performing the offence, have been effective. 
However, if we concentrate on the above-mentioned aspect of criminal 
liability, the objective perspective prevails. Nevertheless, objectivism in this 
respect is imperfect and only confined to effect, whereas one’s behaviour is 
immaterial. In contrast, circumstances and events outside the agent’s power are 
supposed to be main elements of sentencing.  
The opposite approach as the act-centred attitude pays attention to the 
perpetrator’s behaviour and disregards the consequences resulted from his/her 
action. In fact, not to continue the criminal activity on his/her free will is a key 
factor in this regard. A mentionable example for this view is the Penal Code of 
Peru (1991) Article 19 of which stipulates as follows: 
‘‘If several agents involved in fact, the attempt of one who voluntarily 
prevented the outcome is not punishable, nor the one who seriously endeavour to 
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prevent the execution of the offense, but the other participants continue in their 
execution or consummation will be punishable .’’  
However, the Peruvian Penal Code like the criminal statutes of many other 
countries in the world provides that if the agent who has individually attempted to 
commit a crime voluntarily abandons it and his action constitutes another crime, 
he/she will be punished for the act performed. Nevertheless, this punishment is 
not determined to penalize a criminal attempt, but it is considered for a separate 
offence. For example, if someone unlawfully attempts to enter a building 
belonging to another, but after breaking the entrance door, voluntarily desists 
from the entry, he/she will not be punishable for the crime of attempted unlawful 
entry, but may be convicted of the crime of criminal damage. 
Provisions almost similar to the Penal Code of Peru have been included in 
the German Criminal Code. Article 24 reads as follows: 
‘‘1-A person who of his own volition gives up the further execution of the 
offence or prevents its completion shall not be liable for the attempt. If the 
offence is not completed regardless of his actions, that person shall not be liable if 
he has made a voluntary and earnest effort to prevent the completion of the 
offence.  
2- If more than one person participate in the offence, the person who 
voluntarily prevents its completion shall not be liable for the attempt. His 
voluntary and earnest effort to prevent the completion of the offence shall suffice 
for exemption from liability, if the offence is not completed regardless of his 
actions or is committed independently of his earlier contribution to the offence.’’ 
The Criminal Code of Switzerland is the best illustration of the act-centred 
view. It explicitly states that a perpetrator, who makes a serious effort to prevent 
the completion of the crime, may enjoy exemption from penalty or mitigation of 
punishment, even if the offence occurs irrespective of the efforts of that person. 
According to Article 23 (4), ‘‘If one or more of the persons carrying out or 
participating in a criminal act makes a serious effort to prevent the completion of 
the act, the court may reduce the sentence or waive any penalty if an offence is 
committed irrespective of the efforts of that person or persons.’’ 
3.2. Non-recognition of Renunciation as a defense: 
In few criminal justice systems, renunciation has not been recognized as a 
defense to criminal attempts. The question arises in this regard is that what is the 
reason of this approach? The answer probably lies in possible misuse of the 
provisions prescribing such defence. As a general rule, if the attempted crime 
which has been voluntarily discontinued by the perpetrator is itself a separate 
offense, then he/she will be punishable for that offence. However, even the latter 
rule does not convince proponents of the non-recognition view. Their argument is 
based on the proportionality of crime and punishment. Consider a man pulling a 
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gun on somebody with intent to kill him, but voluntarily waives his plan to kill 
the victim. He will be convicted of assault, but not attempted murder if we 
recognize renunciation as a defense.
23
  
Criminal statutes of Uganda and Zambia are among the penal codes which 
have not recognized renunciation as a defense to criminal attempts. According to 
Article 386 of the Penal Code Act of Uganda, ‘‘(1) When a person, intending to 
commit an offence, begins to put his or her intention into execution by means 
adapted to its fulfilment, and manifests his or her intention by some overt act, but 
does not fulfil his or her intention to such an extent as to commit the offence, he 
or she is deemed to attempt to commit the offence. (2) It is immaterial, 
a) except so far as regards punishment, whether the offender does all that is 
necessary on his or her part for completing the commission of the offence, or 
whether the complete fulfilment of his or her intention is prevented by 
circumstances independent of his or her will, or whether the offender desists of 
his or her own motion from the further prosecution of his or her intention, or (b) 
That by reason of circumstances not known to the offender it is impossible in fact 
to commit the offence.’’ 
Article 389 of the Penal Code Act of Zambia containing similar provisions 
reads as follows: 
(1) When a person, intending to commit an offence, begins to put his 
intention into execution by means adapted to its fulfilment, and manifests his 
intention by some overt act, but does not fulfil his intention to such an extent as to 
commit the offence, he is deemed to attempt to commit the offence.  
 (2) It is immaterial, except so far as regards punishment, whether the 
offender does all that is necessary on his part for completing the commission of 
the offence, or whether the complete fulfilment of his intention is prevented by 
circumstances independent of his will, or whether he desists of his own motion 
from the further prosecution of his intention. 
3.3. Renunciation as a defense: 
We could basically sort out three main models of the characterization of 
voluntary renunciation from criminal attempts in various criminal systems. In 
some countries it is considered as a ground for the exemption from criminal 
liability which falls under the category of ‘‘defences’’. However, defences can be 
divided into three categories: ‘‘justifications’’, ‘‘excuses’’ and ‘‘exemptions’’. It is 
essential to clarify the distinctions and legal meaning of these terms before 
explaining the status of renunciation as a defence.   
An act or omission can rightfully be attributed to me whether or not I ever 
exercised control over acquiring the attitude that it expresses. So long as my 
action is rightly taken to be expressive of my real self – so long, that is, as it is the 
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product, in the right kind of way, of my beliefs and desires, values and 
commitments, and not of hypnosis, brain manipulation, mental illness or what 
have you – then it is properly attributable to me. To be sure, control is not 
irrelevant on attributionist accounts. Absence of control may block attribution to 
me of the attitudes apparently expressed by my acts. Suppose that my action was 
not a product of my beliefs and desires, but instead produced by the intervention 
of a nefarious neuroscientist, by coercion or by certain kinds of (transient) mental 
illness. In that case, the action does not reflect where I stand on questions of 
value, and cannot be attributed to me. Absence of control matters only to this 
extent, on the attributionist account.
 24
 
Although there has been considerable debate about definitions, most 
theorists should find the following accounts acceptable. At least two grounds may 
give rise to a defence after a person has apparently violated a criminal law. First, 
properties or characteristics of the defendant's act may create a defence. Second, 
properties or characteristics of the defendant himself may create a defence. 
Justifications are defences that arise from properties or characteristics of acts; 
excuses are defences that arise from properties or characteristics of actors. A 
defendant is justified when his conduct is not legally wrongful, even though it 
apparently violates a criminal law. A defendant is excused when he is not 
blameworthy or responsible for his conduct, even though it apparently violates a 
criminal law (Husak, 1989, 496).
25
 Putting in other words, justifications can be 
invoked where the circumstances or facts make the conduct legally plausible, 
whereas excuses eliminate moral blame of the perpetrator even where his or her 
behaviour was criminal.
26
 Nevertheless, there is also another discernible defence 
called exemption from criminal liability which can be based on either the 
uselessness of punishment and/or crime prevention considerations. Although 
some cases of this defence like renunciation lies in a lack of blameworthiness, the 
latter perspectives are more prominent in this regard. Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Moldova (2009) has specifically put ‘‘voluntary abandonment of a 
crime’’ under the title of ‘‘Exemption from Criminal Liability’’,27  Article 56 of 
which reads as follows:  
 (1) Voluntary abandonment of a crime shall be considered the cessation by 
the person of the preparation of a crime or the cessation of actions (inaction) 
directly aimed at committing a crime provided that the person was aware of the 
possibility of consummating the crime.  
(2) A person may not be subject to criminal liability for a crime if he/she 
voluntarily and irreversibly abandons the completion of the crime.  
(3) A person who voluntarily abandons the consummation of a crime shall 
be subject to criminal liability only if the act committed includes another 
consummated crime. 
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Criminal code of the Kingdom of Spain (2013) has also recognized 
voluntary renunciation as a ground for exemption of criminal liability; according 
to Article 16 (2): 
‘‘Whoever voluntarily avoids the offence being consummated, either by 
going no further with its commission when already commenced, or by preventing 
the result from taking place, shall be exempt from criminal accountability, 
without prejudice to the accountability he or she may have incurred for the acts 
perpetrated, should these already have constituted another felony or 
misdemeanour.’’ 
Accordingly, Criminal Code of the Czech Republic (2009) has regarded 
voluntary renunciation as an expiry of criminal liability. It has been stipulated by 
Article 21 (3) as follows: 
‘‘Criminal liability for an attempted criminal offence shall expire if an 
offender voluntarily abandoned further conduct leading to the completion of the 
criminal offence and, 
a) Removed the threat to an interest protected by the Criminal Code which 
occurred due to the committed attempt, or  
b) Reported the attempt to commit an especially serious felony at a time 
the threat to an interest protected by the Criminal Code which occurred due to the 
committed attempt could still be removed; the report must be made to a public 
prosecutor or police authority. A soldier may report it to his/her superior officer.’’ 
Despite the fact that ‘‘exemption from criminal liability’’ is very close to 
‘‘excuses’’ in that both concepts are based on the exclusion of criminal 
responsibility, it should be noted that the distinction between the two terms is 
unavoidable. In fact, an ‘‘excuse’’ has a personal aspect and relates to offenders’ 
physical or mental characteristics
28
, whereas grounds for exemption of 
punishment are not necessarily and variably related to personal attributes of the 
offender. Additionally, the rationale of irresponsibility of the perpetrator is 
different regarding each of the two defences. While irresponsibility in respect of 
‘‘excuses’’ is resulted from incapacity of an offender and a lack of mental element 
of the offence, the reason of the exclusion of criminal responsibility in the context 
of ‘‘exemption from criminal liability’’ is either the uselessness of sentencing or 
the preventive policy of the criminal justice system. As regards voluntary 
renunciation the latter seems to be a good basis for the offender’s exemption of 
criminal liability.  
3.4.Renunciation as a Ground for Exemption from Punishment: 
Punishment is a problematic concept, because it can be understood and 
defined in multiple ways. Punishment may be considered synonymous with 
sentence or legal sanction; a state-imposed response to a crime. However, in the 
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Criminal Justice Act of the United Kingdom (CJA) 2003 it is regarded as one of 
the purposes of a sentence, hinting at its retributive value. Rather than a purpose 
in itself, punishment may also be considered instrumental in achieving other 
aims, such as reducing crime through deterrence and rehabilitation. The CJA 
2003 is an amalgam of retributive and utilitarian justifications of punishment. 
Section 142(1) of the CJA 2003 states that a court ‘must have regard to the 
following purposes of sentencing’: (a) the punishment of offenders, (b) the 
reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence), (c) the reform and 
rehabilitation of offenders, (d) the protection of the public, and (e) the making of 
reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences. A court needs to 
have regard for other purposes of sentencing than punishment (or retribution), 
including reduction of crime, reform of offenders, protection of the public and 
reparation.
29
 
Traditionally, punishment is considered as a moral communication.  
Antony Duff formulated a normative theory of communicative punishment, 
which regards punishment (or hard treatment) as a form of two-way 
communication: it sends a message to offenders that they have done wrong, and it 
also constitutes an apology from the offender to the victim and community (Duff, 
2011)
30
. While the hard treatment is an expression of an apology, it does not 
require that the offender is actually remorseful. Nonetheless, punishment 
potentially has the ability to effect repentance, positive behavioural change and 
reconciliation – although its effectiveness should not be judged on this basis.31 
As regards voluntary renunciation, exemption from punishment is based on 
the fact that imposing punishment on a renouncing agent will not realize any of 
the purposes of punishment. Besides the lack of social and ethical obscenity of 
the abandoned conduct, the remorsefulness of a person who voluntarily abandons 
the crime renders the penalty useless. These two perspectives are both illustrated 
by criminal statutes of most countries. It should be noted that in many criminal 
systems a perpetrator’s actual remorsefulness may take place in terms of either 
desisting from the criminal act or preventing the prohibited consequences. For 
instance, Section 50 of the Norwegian General Civil Penal Code (1902, as 
amended by the Act of 21 December of 2005) states that ‘An Attempt shall cease 
to be punishable if the offender, before he knows that the felonious activity has 
been discovered, of his own free will either desists from the felonious activity 
before the attempt has been completed or prevents the result that would constitute 
the completed felony.’ 32 
However, in some countries like Australia both voluntary abandonment 
and prevention from criminal results are necessary to exercise exemption of 
punishment. Section 11.2A (6) of the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 
(consolidated as of July 1, 2017) provides that, ‘A person cannot be found guilty 
of an offence because of the operation of this section if, before the conduct 
constituting any of the physical elements of the joint offence concerned was 
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engaged in, the person: (a) terminated his or her involvement; and (b) took all 
reasonable steps to prevent that conduct from being engaged in.’33 
While the factors of exemption from criminal liability eliminate the 
offender’s criminal responsibility, grounds for exemption of punishment are legal 
factors that lead to the waiving of punishment. These two concepts may seem 
identical in that the result is the same, namely impunity. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that moral blameworthiness in the case of ‘‘exemption from 
punishment’’ is far more significant than the defence of ‘‘exemption from 
criminal liability’’. Additionally, the social obscenity of the factors which result in 
impunity is more than the circumstances under which an exemption from criminal 
liability is held by the court. This is of great importance as a matter of social 
attitude.
34
  
Last but not least, there is a procedural matter which should be taken into 
account; as regards ‘‘exemption from criminal liability’’ both the prosecution and 
trial judges are empowered to decide, whereas in the case of ‘‘impunity’’, only 
courts may determine whether the defendant should be exempted from 
punishment, it is because that an exemption from punishment is preceded by the 
existence of criminal liability and requires a full consideration by a court. Putting 
in other words, the defendant shall be exempted from punishment, despite having 
criminal responsibility.       
3.5. Renunciation as a Mitigating Factor: 
Voluntary renunciation from a criminal attempt is considered as a 
mitigating factor in some criminal justice systems. The Iranian Former Penal 
Code (1992), Criminal Code of Switzerland (2018), Criminal Code of the 
People’s Republic of China (1997), and Penal Code of Poland are among the 
criminal statutes that have recognized voluntary abandonment as a mitigating 
factor in one way or another. It may apply to all variations of voluntary 
renunciation or only to certain circumstances.  
Article 41 (Note 2) of the Iranian Former Penal Code (1992) provided that 
‘‘whoever has attempted to commit a crime abandons the criminal act on his or 
her own free will, shall be subject to a mitigation of punishment, if the act 
performed itself constitutes another crime.’’ 
As it can be seen, voluntary abandonment was not considered as a defence, 
but judges had to apply mitigation of punishment in this regard. The expression 
‘‘if the act performed itself constitutes another crime’’ , had been provided due to 
a special model of criminal attempts; according to the former penal code an 
attempt was punishable only if it were stipulated in the special part of criminal 
code. In other words, no attempt was generally regarded as a criminal act, unless 
it was specified in the statute. It should be added that according to the current 
Iranian Penal Code (2003) all criminal attempts are punishable. In addition, 
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renunciation of a criminal attempt is considered as a defence; according to Article 
123 ‘‘a person who voluntarily abandons the criminal attempt, shall not be 
punishable, but if the act performed itself constitutes another crime, the 
perpetrator shall be punishable for that crime.’’ Unlike the abolished Act, the 
present statute has not provided a mitigating factor for a renouncing perpetrator 
when the act performed itself constitutes a separate criminal act. 
Swiss Criminal Code (2018) empowers courts to reduce the sentence or 
waive any penalty in respect of a person who does not complete the criminal act 
on his or her own free will as well as anyone who assists in preventing the 
completion of the criminal act. In this model, courts are granted unlimited 
discretion to decide whether to punish a perpetrator or not.
35
  Any decision on this 
issue will be largely based on theoretical approaches to punishment. Thinking 
about the issue of punishment gives rise to a number of questions, the most 
fundamental of which is, why should offenders be punished? This question might 
produce the following responses: 
• They deserve to be punished.  
• Punishment will stop them from committing further crimes.  
• Punishment tells the victim that society disapproves of the harm that he or 
she has suffered. 
 • Punishment discourages others from doing the same thing.  
• Punishment protects society from dangerous or dishonest people.  
• Punishment allows an offender to make amends for the harm he or she 
has caused.  
• Punishment ensures that people understand that laws are there to be 
obeyed. 
Over time there have been shifts in penal theory, and therefore in the 
purpose of punishment due to a complex set of reasons including politics, public 
policy, and social movements. Consequently, in a cyclical process, an early focus 
on deterrence as the rationale for punishment gave way to a focus on reform and 
rehabilitation. This, in turn, has led to a return to punishment based on the notion 
of retribution and just deserts.
36
 
In Criminal Code of the People’s Republic of China (1997) an exemption 
or mitigation of punishment in the case of voluntary renunciation depends on the 
occurrence of the criminal result (damage). In other words, if no damage is 
caused, the perpetrator shall be exempted from punishment or, if any damage is 
caused, be given a mitigated punishment.
37
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Article 15 of the Penal Code of Poland (1997) reads as follows:‘1. 
Whoever has voluntarily abandoned the prohibited act or prevented the 
consequence shall not be subject to penalty for the attempt.  
2. The court may apply an extraordinary mitigation of punishment to a 
perpetrator who has voluntarily attempted to prevent the consequence which 
constituted a feature of the prohibited act.’ 
Unlike the Chinese and Swiss criminal statutes, mitigating factor in Polish 
criminal law is a judicial and not a legal factor. In other words, it is optional for 
judges to exercise a mitigation of punishment.   
4. Conclusion: 
Basically, criminal law seeks to penalize those who endanger public order 
by committing criminal offences. It seems to be a simple proposition, but at the 
same time a problematic one. It is because that irrespective of the complexity of 
the content and scope of public order, the danger element is almost a vague 
notion. Our attitudes towards the danger of criminal results largely depend on the 
nature of the effects and consequences that may be caused by criminal behaviours 
as well as the justification of criminal law. This is why the doctrines of criminal 
attempted liability and voluntary abandonment of those who freely desist from 
criminal attempts are so important.       
Perhaps the most essential aspect of any discussion about renunciation 
from criminal attempts is that the rationales of criminal liability and punishment 
underpin criminal systems’ approaches to the issue. As a generally accepted 
justification of modern criminal law, preventive view both at the individual and 
social levels can be considered as a logical ground for non-punishment of 
voluntary renunciation.  
Voluntary renunciation from criminal attempts, as distinct from withdrawal 
from complicity, has also been discussed in terms of its characterization as an 
advantageous factor. The consequentialist and act-centred views offer different 
suggestions on this topic. According to proponents of the consequentialist view, 
the criminal result is a more important factor than the criminal action and/or 
intent in that it should be the main determinative factor of criminal reaction to 
voluntary abandonment. In contrast, the act-centred approach gives priority to the 
perpetrator’s behaviour and disregards the consequences resulted from his/her 
action. In fact, discontinuation of the criminal activity on his/her free will is a key 
factor in this regard. 
The abandonment of a criminal attempt has been recognized as a ground 
for exemption of criminal liability and/or impunity in many criminal justice 
systems and as an irrelevant factor in few countries. Some other criminal systems 
have included it as a mitigating factor in their statutes. It may be binding or 
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optional for courts to exercise mitigation of punishment in the case of voluntary 
renunciation.    
Voluntary renunciation as a reason of exemption of criminal liability 
should be distinct from ‘‘justifications’’ and ‘‘excuses’’. In the case of 
justification, the defendant’s conduct is not legally wrongful, even though it 
apparently violates a criminal law. A defendant is excused when he is not morally 
and legally blameworthy or responsible for his conduct, even though it apparently 
violates a criminal law. However, voluntary renunciation as a ground for 
exemption from criminal liability does not relate to individual specialities of the 
offender. Additionally, the origin of irresponsibility in the context of excuses may 
be incapacity or the lack of mental element, but the reason of exemption of 
criminal liability is either the uselessness of sentencing or the preventive policy 
of the criminal justice system.  
Finally, although the result of the characterization of voluntary 
renunciation as a ground for exemption from criminal liability and/or impunity is 
the same, a distinction should be made in terms of legal basis as well as moral 
blameworthiness. In addition, the procedural technique of considering the two 
grounds is not identical. Anyway, characterization voluntary renunciation as a 
ground for exemption from criminal liability seems to be a more suitable means to 
achieve the goals of criminal justice policies and to realize the social and 
individual interests.  
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